11-6-2023 (HONG KONG) Highly sensitive documents purportedly from Taiwan’s military intelligence agency have been circulating online, revealing details of spy operations targeting mainland China. The files were first offered for sale on a foreign website last month for US$150,000, according to Hong Kong news outlet HK01.
Upon examining the files, HK01 journalists found that despite the lack of diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Malaysia, an agent from Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau had allegedly “cooperated” with Malaysia’s foreign intelligence agency, known as MEIO. Through giving gifts and hosting meals, the agent obtained analyses from the Malaysian government, including on its military deployment in the South China Sea. One of the officials involved was Datuk Hisamuddin Bin Sujak, currently the director-general of the Research Division in the Prime Minister’s Department.
The files spanned at least four intelligence units and revealed the daily operations of agents stationed in different locations, as well as personal information on several “sources”, including a Hong Kong citizen. For example, a unit coded “26ME583” was tasked in 2021 with collecting intelligence on “the models and numbers of helicopters in each army aviation brigade of the PLA and the modification status of the Z-8 and Z-20 helicopters” and “the latest training outlines of the PLA”. According to a “0329-0404 weekly report”, members of the unit were in almost daily contact with different individuals, including mainland Chinese students and casino employees in Malaysia, naval attachés at the US embassy in Malaysia, and military attachés from ASEAN countries and Japan. They also cooperated with the deputy director-general and an analyst from MEIO’s East Asia division.
In addition, members of “26ME583” conducted online scouting and data searches three times in one week. It is speculated that “online scouting” refers to posting disguised job listings on social media and dating sites to identify and develop new sources who could provide them with intelligence and information. For example, a colonel from another unit “23SK756” spent nearly nine hours on May 5 “searching through communication records of military and government personnel in the area on dating sites and sending contact messages”, as well as six hours the next day “identifying willing subjects for our use” through a Chinese dating app and job sites.
Unit “09OW588” provided details of intelligence collection and development in its “Weekly Work Report” from March 30 to April 5. It submitted three pieces of intelligence that week, including on the berthing of ships at a PLA naval port and the list of volunteers China planned to send to Confucius Institutes abroad in the second half of the year. In its development records, the unit mentioned that it had met a 28-year-old active service member named “Zhou Chengxiang” near the 81st Group Army’s army aviation brigade using a dating app. It had exchanged direct contact details with Zhou and was verifying his real identity and access to intelligence, as well as inquiring about any recent military exercises.
The files from unit “32WS181” contained attachments detailing the development of a source named Hong Junmo in a process that covered basic information, how he was identified, access to intelligence, family background, relationships, finances, daily life, intelligence provided, security level, development methods, and funds required.
Hong, 32, was a deputy county-level official in mainland China who could “access sensitive intelligence about Qinghai province”. From February to May 2021, Hong sold 17 pieces of intelligence worth 5,000 yuan (currency unspecified) each to Taiwan’s agents, with a response rate of 58%. He was rated as having “good work effectiveness”. Hong was identified after Taiwanese agent Pan posted a disguised job advertisement on a website. With a heavy financial burden of 400,000 New Taiwan dollars (around US$13,500) in monthly household expenses, mortgage payments and car loans, Hong was financially struggling and tempted by money offered by Taiwan’s agents to provide intelligence on China’s “14th Five-Year Plan”.
The assessment of contacts with Hong noted that he was “cautious and discreet, deeply afraid of exposing purple (the colour associated with espionage), and had a good understanding of confidentiality”, caring only about “the content of transactions for money and intelligence” and showing no interest in the agents’ backgrounds or the source of the funds. However, to ensure security, the agents would regularly change the passwords of their communication accounts, strengthen password complexity, establish backup systems and communication channels in line with security standards, and “avoid enemy monitoring”. They also carefully justified the source of the funds to Hong to “avoid arousing security suspicions”.
Future plans for developing Hong included continuing to offer “work subsidies” and “intelligence rewards” as incentives while strengthening “emotional control” over him to increase his dependence and loyalty. They would instruct Hong to follow the principle of “listen but do not ask, see but do not obtain” and, through his access, collect high-value intelligence, working towards “selected guidance targets”.
Nearly 20 sources included a 65-year-old married Hong Kong man known as “Lam Ping Cheong”, reportedly an “expert on relations between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan” and a “current affairs commentator” who was “disappointed with Hong Kong’s political governance but also accepted (the status quo)”. According to how he was identified, Lan was introduced to agent Zheng Yiting in 2019 by a former head of a Taiwan intelligence unit, Gao Shangxiao. Zheng, who was using the cover of an editor for an online media platform, had continued to contact Lan under the pretext of interviewing him on cross-strait hot topics and the views of mainland Chinese scholars.
The files show Lan had two tasks: referring mainlanders who could be developed as sources, and providing the opinions of mainland scholars on Taiwan. According to an “assessment of character”, Lam was steady and talkative but cared about his reputation, and had a certain understanding of confidentiality. Although contact had been maintained, there had been no concrete results. The agents recommended continuing to build up the relationship by showing concern for Lam’s living conditions, then trying to induce him to provide useful information.
Article 23 will address ‘spy crimes’
Under Article 110 of China’s Criminal Law, participating in a spy organisation or accepting missions from a spy organisation or its agents constitutes the crime of spying. Those guilty of grave circumstances face over 10 years in prison, life imprisonment or the death penalty. China’s Anti-Spy Law specifies that activities such as theft, infiltration, bribery, illegally providing state secrets or intelligence and other documents, data, information or items relating to state security and interests, or instigating, luring, coercing or bribing state employees to defect, carried out or directed by overseas agencies, organisations or individuals other than spy organisations and their agents, or colluded in by domestic agencies, organisations or individuals, constitute spying. Any citizen participating in such activities will be legally prosecuted.
Although Hong Kong has enacted the National Security Law, it does not yet have a law against spying. Last month, Liang Chengyun, who held both Hong Kong permanent resident and US passports and was once active in cross-strait and overseas Chinese community affairs, was convicted of spying by the Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court in Jiangsu province and sentenced to life imprisonment, deprivation of political rights for life, and a fine of 500,000 yuan. Chief Executive John Lee said the case showed Hong Kong still faced potential risks to national security and vigilance could not be relaxed. Security minister Ambrose D’Aunno had already revealed that authorities were actively studying legislation under Article 23 of the Basic Law, which would also strengthen measures against crimes such as spying and theft of state secrets.
On January 16 this year, Taiwanese media reported that military enthusiasts had discovered documents purporting to contain Taiwanese military secrets being offered for sale on a foreign website for US$150,000. Taiwan’s intelligence agencies were said to be highly concerned and the legal authorities quickly launched an investigation, but the authenticity of the documents could not be confirmed, raising serious questions about major security loopholes in intelligence work. A month later, Taiwanese authorities have still not made a public statement on the incident. However, related documents have circulated and been published openly on forums in Taiwan and Malaysia. Strangely, Taiwanese media suddenly fell silent on the topic and no follow-up reports have appeared. HK01 journalists also received an anonymous email earlier with the title “US$150,000 intelligence information”, parts of which were similar to earlier Taiwanese media reports, while other details were likely those the media did not dare report in detail. This report is published as a warning to Hong Kong citizens to exercise caution to avoid accidentally falling foul of the law.
