10-6-2023 (MANILA) The recent article by The Economist, a British magazine, provided a comical yet telling insight into the state of the insurgency led by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The piece, titled “The Philippines’ once-proud Maoist insurgents are out of ammo,” revealed the dwindling power of the New People’s Army (NPA), the private army of the CPP. The NPA’s salute to fallen comrades was reduced to a silent gesture, possibly due to a shortage of ammunition or fear of alerting the police.
The NPA, which was launched 54 years ago with the aim of overthrowing the American-backed president Ferdinand Marcos, now finds itself on the verge of surrender to Marcos’ son and successor, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos. The article served as a concise obituary for the CPP and its armed wing, the NPA, labeling them relics of political folly.
In its prime, the NPA boasted an estimated 25,000 fighters and posed a threat to American troops stationed in the Philippines during the Cold War. However, after Marcos’ downfall in 1986 following a popular uprising, which the NPA played no role in, the restoration of democracy and accelerated economic growth made armed revolution less appealing to the younger generation of Filipinos. As the NPA’s numbers dwindled, its leaders became engrossed in ideological debates, leading to revisions such as the “Second Great Rectification Movement” in the 1990s. Meanwhile, the NPA resorted to extorting “revolutionary taxes” from local businesses.
Despite the NPA’s diminished significance, the United States designated the Communist Party, its guerrillas, as well as Filipino jihadists and Islamist separatist groups as terrorists in 2002, seeking adversaries for its global war on terror. The NPA threatened reprisals against American targets but failed to regain notoriety. Following the defeat of the jihadists and a negotiated settlement with the Islamist separatists, the NPA now stands as the Philippines’ last internal security threat. However, Bongbong Marcos has little cause for concern as the group currently comprises only about 2,000 fighters, lacking a national leader. The CPP’s founder, Joma Sison, passed away in exile last December. The government claims that the NPA’s other prominent leaders, Benito Tiamzon and his wife Wilma Austria, were killed at sea during a confrontation with the armed forces, while the guerrillas assert that the government murdered them and destroyed their bodies. Regardless, it is clear that the revolution did not achieve its goals.
Numerous articles have now emerged speculating on the demise of the CPP and the NPA. A piece by Michael Hart on the news website Asian Sentinel, titled “Communists Crumbling in the Philippines,” provides further insight into the NPA’s fading influence. Hart, who has conducted research for the International Institute for Strategic Studies and Action on Armed Violence, details the struggles faced by the NPA.
According to the Philippine military, the NPA’s days are numbered. In recent years, the group’s strength has decreased from 4,000 rebels to 2,112, with only 24 active guerrilla fronts out of 89 nationwide. The NPA possesses a mere 1,800 firearms. With no prominent figure emerging to replace Sison, Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s administration has set its sights on ending the insurgency, four decades after his father’s failed attempt to quell it under martial law.
The military highlights the NPA’s challenges, emphasizing its degradation in various regions. Major General Benedict Arevalo, the Armed Forces chief in the Visayas, states that the NPA has been drastically weakened in the region, particularly in Eastern Visayas, where they lack leadership and operational direction. The AFP claims that only two NPA fronts remain, with approximately 200 fighters each. The rebels primarily hide in the mountains of Samar, avoiding confrontations with soldiers to protect their positions. Arevalo adds that rebels in the Western Visayas are increasingly demoralized, with no clear guidance after the death of their commander, Rogelio Posadas.
In Eastern Mindanao, another NPA stronghold, the situation is similar. With the death of their senior commander, Menandro Villanueva, and intensified military operations, only four active rebel fronts remain out of the previous 32 in the region. Marcos, the successor to Duterte, declares an imminent end to the half-century-long fight with insurgents. The National Security Council echoes this sentiment, proclaiming a “strategic victory” over the NPA and foreseeing “total victory” within two years.
The government attributes the NPA’s decline not only to military offensives but also to the establishment of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-Elcac) in 2018. This body engages with NPA commanders at the local level, encouraging insurgents to surrender their arms in exchange for support through the Enhanced-Comprehensive Local Integration Program (E-Clip). Development funds have also been directed to rebel-affected villages to weaken the NPA’s support base.
With the passing of Sison and the demise of the Tiamzons, there seems to be no one left for the government to negotiate with. It hopes that Sison’s death and the resulting blow to morale will lead more NPA rebels to surrender. However, controversy surrounds the number of surrenderees, with accusations that the task force includes NPA supporters and family members of former combatants on its list.
While the CPP acknowledges setbacks, it denies the extent of its losses and rebuffs the AFP’s claims of few remaining active fronts. The NPA still maintains a presence across its historical areas of operation, engaging in armed clashes and violent incidents in 29 provinces from January to May 2023. However, the group is on the defensive, with proactive attacks becoming increasingly rare. The casualty figures reveal a clear asymmetry, with 68 NPA rebels killed compared to only six AFP troops. Most clashes were initiated by government soldiers during routine patrols or intelligence-based operations.
Although the NPA maintains a presence in certain strongholds such as Eastern Mindanao, Samar, Masbate, and Negros Island, its influence over local communities has significantly diminished. Arson attacks and raids on businesses for weapons have become infrequent, limiting the rebels’ ability to sustain and finance their campaign.
As romanticized portrayals of the CPP and NPA fade, there is a growing rush to write the obituary of this once-formidable insurgency. The declining numbers and diminishing influence of the NPA suggest that its days are indeed numbered. Whether it is due to military pressure, government initiatives, or changing dynamics within Filipino society, the revolution that once seemed poised for victory has ultimately failed to achieve its goals.
