5-5-2024 (YANGON) As revelers in Myanmar celebrated the traditional New Year in mid-April, the festive mood was overshadowed by the looming specter of conscription enforced by the military regime led by Senior Gen. Min Aung Hlaing. The abrupt implementation of the People’s Military Service Law, enacted in 2010 but shelved during the transition to civilian rule, has cast a pall over the nation’s society, already reeling from the junta’s oppressive rule since the February 2021 coup.
The draft, initially applying to men aged 18 to 35, is a desperate attempt by the regime to bolster its dwindling forces. According to Ye Myo Hein, a visiting senior expert at the U.S. Institute of Peace, the Myanmar military, once touted as a 350,000-strong force, had dwindled to fewer than 130,000 troops by the end of 2023, as regional bases fell to ethnic minority groups and pro-democracy forces, and morale plummeted amid drone attacks and desertions.
“Conscription is necessary for the peace and stability of the country,” Min Aung Hlaing declared on March 27, addressing an Armed Forces Day ceremony. However, his words ring hollow, as he himself is the architect of the nation’s turmoil, having toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s civilian government and presided over the deaths of an estimated 4,900 civilians, according to human rights groups.
Min Aung Hlaing’s path to power has been a study in contradictions. Born in southern Myanmar to a government employee, he initially pursued law studies at Rangoon Arts and Sciences University in the early 1970s, steering clear of the pro-democracy movement that swept the nation. After multiple attempts, he gained admission to the Defense Services Academy in 1974, embarking on a military career that would see him rise through the ranks steadily.
He distinguished himself in quelling the 2007 Saffron Revolution, a protest against military rule by Buddhist monks, and in suppressing ethnic minority forces in eastern Shan state in 2008. Appointed commander-in-chief in 2011, during the country’s transition to civilian rule, Min Aung Hlaing initially cultivated an “enlightened” image, frequently traveling abroad and actively using social media to disseminate information.
However, his belligerent side emerged in 2017 with the military’s persecution of the Muslim Rohingya minority, straining his relationship with Suu Kyi. When her National League for Democracy (NLD) party dealt a crushing defeat to the military-backed party in the November 2020 general election, Min Aung Hlaing cited voter fraud allegations and seized power through a military takeover.
Now in his 14th year as commander-in-chief and heading the State Administration Council that controls the military government, Min Aung Hlaing wields absolute power akin to only two others in Myanmar’s modern history: Gen. Ne Win, who ruled for 26 years after toppling the civilian government in 1962, and Senior Gen. Than Shwe, who led a military government for 20 years from 1992 after ousting Ne Win in an internal coup.
While Ne Win was an autocrat, Than Shwe was a consensus builder who zealously pushed the military’s economic interests, establishing Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEHL) and Myanmar Economic Corp. (MEC) to ensure the fruits of growth benefited the military and its personnel. He also orchestrated the transition to civilian rule, carrying out a 2010 general election that paved the way for the Thein Sein government, ushering in democratization and economic reform that transformed Myanmar into “Asia’s final economic frontier.”
According to Tin Win, a visiting researcher at the Center for South Asian Studies at Gifu Women’s University and former NLD member, Min Aung Hlaing’s motivation for derailing this progress was his desire to become president – a position Suu Kyi denied him, offering him the vice presidency instead.
“Min Aung Hlaing craved to become a civilian president. He wanted to be like Thein Sein, who was loved and respected by the public, rather than Ne Win or Than Shwe, a leader they feared,” said Tin Win. “He cannot accept the gap between his ideal and the reality.”
Despite Min Aung Hlaing’s assertion that his regime would be “different from those in the past,” his brutality in suppressing opposition mirrors that of his predecessors. The only distinction is that he now finds himself in a military quagmire, with his troops being pushed back by anti-regime forces in rural regions.
Even as the political situation deteriorates, Min Aung Hlaing clings to the notion of holding a “free and fair” general election, perhaps a last-ditch attempt to realize his ambition of becoming a “civilian president” or a ploy to ensure his personal safety after retirement.
At 67, the once-aspiring dictator may have become someone he never envisioned, but he nonetheless wields immense and arbitrary power, casting a dark shadow over Myanmar’s prospects for peace and stability.
