12-6-2023 (HONG KONG) Highly classified documents allegedly from Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau that were recently leaked online have revealed Taipei would struggle against aerial assaults by the PLA, causing unease on the island. Yet what worries the Taiwanese military even more is likely the glaring loopholes in its own intelligence mechanisms.
In mid-January, Taiwanese media widely reported that someone was openly selling 10GB of “confidential documents from Taiwan’s intelligence agency” on a foreign website for USD150,000 (around HKD1.18 million or TWD4.5 million). Taiwan’s Investigation Bureau under the Ministry of Justice quickly stepped in to investigate but has yet to confirm their authenticity. Local media have also let the matter rest, with only limited information circulating online. HK01 recently received related documents, the content of which mainly involved Taiwan’s intelligence gathering on mainland China over the past two years, as well as information on intelligence personnel stationed in locations including Taiwan, Guangdong, Fujian, Hong Kong and Malaysia.
It was discovered that Malaysia’s intelligence organisation was marked by Taiwanese intelligence agents as a “cooperative partner”. In addition to providing analyses from within Malaysia to Taiwan, it revealed the deployment and defensive strategies of its troops occupying islands in the South China Sea to Taiwan. With no diplomatic ties between Malaysia and Taiwan, if the intelligence personnel of both sides were truly exchanging military intelligence, it would inevitably put the Anwar administration in an awkward position, or even trigger diplomatic storms. Taiwanese international strategic researchers worry that selling intelligence is a serious violation of discipline, which could upset military morale.
On January 16 this year, many Taiwanese media reported that military enthusiasts had found documents claiming to contain “Taiwan’s confidential intelligence” being sold on a foreign website for USD150,000. In addition to basic information on intelligence officers such as names, locations and missions, the content included family background, working conditions, personality traits, political assessments, character weaknesses, and even suggestions on how to obtain more intelligence through different “sources”. Taiwan’s intelligence agencies were highly concerned and the judicial authorities quickly intervened to investigate, but they failed to confirm the authenticity, raising serious questions about major security loopholes in intelligence work.
A month later, the Taiwanese authorities have still not made a public statement on the incident. However, related documents have begun circulating and being published openly on forums in Taiwan and Malaysia. Strangely, Taiwanese media have suddenly become low-key, with no follow-up reports. Earlier, HK01 journalists also received an anonymous email titled “USD150,000 intelligence information”. It mainly contained two documents, part of which were similar to earlier Taiwanese media reports, while the rest were likely details the media did not dare report in detail.
Most startling was that a Taiwanese intelligence unit or personnel coded “RuiP3003” was suspected of cooperating with Malaysia’s intelligence organisation. Through giving gifts and hosting meals, it obtained analyses from within the Malaysian government.
Judging from expense receipts with handwritten notes like “dinner with chief deputy director of cooperative organisation”, “transport for consultation dinner with director of East Asia division of cooperative organisation” and “gift for director of International Division of cooperative organisation”, “RuiP3003” was usually stationed in Malaysia. Using the identity of “Zhang Fengyu”, it worked in the Information Division of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Malaysia and was responsible for contacting different organisations or individuals, including Malaysia’s intelligence organisation, to obtain intelligence and report back to Taiwan.
According to the resumes of “Director of Cooperative Organisation” and “Chief Deputy Director (Analysis) of Cooperative Organisation”, the titles “Director of National Intelligence Agency” and “Chief Deputy Director (Analysis) of National Intelligence Agency” appeared. The “cooperative partner” provided intelligence to Taiwan at least three times, including an overview of the deployment and defensive strategies of troops occupying five islands in the South China Sea, reactions to Taiwan’s live-fire drills on Dongsha and Nansha islands, and views on the Philippines’ plan to restart construction on disputed islands in the South China Sea.
Research Department is the National Intelligence Agency
One organisation, two signboards
According to the documents, the “Director of National Intelligence Agency” was Datuk Rostam Affendi Dato’ Salleh (editor’s note: there is a spelling error here, it should be Datuk Rostam Affendi bin Dato’ Salleh). He had served as an intelligence officer of Malaysia’s National Intelligence Agency, First Secretary at the Malaysian Embassy in Switzerland, Advisor to the Senior Officers’ Corps at the British High Commission, Head of the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit and Deputy Secretary General of the Ministry of Trade and Consumer Affairs. An internet search for “Datuk Rostam Affendi bin Dato’ Salleh” did yield information similar to that in the documents, but did not mention the so-called “National Intelligence Agency”. However, in 2020-2022, he appeared in official reports as “Director General of the Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department”. As of this April, his name appeared on a list of “Deputy Secretary Generals” but his current whereabouts are unknown.
The documents showed the “Chief Deputy Director (Analysis) of National Intelligence Agency” was Datuk Hisamuddin Bin Sujak. Internet search results were also similar to the documents. Datuk Hisamuddin Bin Sujak had served in various overseas posts in the Malaysian government and became Director General of the Department of National Unity under the Prime Minister’s Department in 2019. As of January this year, reports showed he had succeeded Datuk Rostam Affendi as the new “Director General of the Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department”.
Research shows the “Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department” and Malaysia’s intelligence organisation “External Intelligence Organisation” (MEIO) were “one organisation, two signboards”. Established in the 1960s, MEIO was similar to other countries’ “central intelligence agencies”, comprising experts from various backgrounds and fields including information technology, security and disaster relief, diplomacy and negotiations. It currently has about 1,000 members gathering and sharing intelligence worldwide, providing internal intelligence analysis to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. In addition to MEIO, Malaysia also has the National Security Council (MKN), Chief Government Security Office (CGSO), Royal Intelligence Corps (KRD), Defence Intelligence Department (DSID) and Royal Malaysia Police Special Branch.
No diplomatic ties between Malaysia and Taiwan
Selling military intelligence shows corruption and decadence
It can be seen that the “National Intelligence Agency” referred to in the documents was the “Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department”, which is MEIO. If the intelligence was authentic, it meant MEIO was Taiwan’s intelligence agency’s “cooperative partner” and provided analyses from within the Malaysian government to Taiwan, including important military intelligence.
Most notably, as Malaysia upholds the “One China” principle, it does not have diplomatic ties with Taiwan. If the documents were authentic, it would be puzzling as to exactly what form the “cooperation” between the two sides took. Was it “organisational contact” or “individual behaviour”? Was the Malaysian government aware of it? Had Datuk Rostam Affendi, the supposed “Director of National Intelligence Agency”, and Datuk Hisamuddin Bin Sujak, the supposed “Chief Deputy Director (Analysis) of National Intelligence Agency”, been directly involved? Moreover, Datuk Hisamuddin Bin Sujak had contact with “RuiP3003” and has now been promoted to Director General of the Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department, i.e. Director of the National Intelligence Agency. Would this deepen intelligence exchange between Malaysia and Taiwan? Would it put the China-friendly Anwar administration in an awkward position? HK01 has contacted the Prime Minister’s Department of Malaysia for clarification but has not received a reply as of press time.
However, Taiwanese media have generally downplayed the information, with no major reports mentioning Malaysia and Taiwan’s “intelligence cooperation”. Not until March 4 did Luo Le, deputy researcher at the Taiwan International Strategic Study Society, mention some information circulating on forums about contact between Taiwanese intelligence officer “Zhang Fengyu” and Malaysia’s intelligence unit in his article “Selling intelligence online is Taiwan’s biggest security problem” published in the media. He pointed out that if military intelligence personnel put the intelligence they obtained up for sale online, “this is the problem of corruption, decadence and recklessness”. He suggested the greens investigate to avoid upsetting military morale.
A history of MEIO Anwar government in awkward position
It is worth mentioning that in July 2018, MEIO was embroiled in the “Spygate” scandal. Then Director General of the Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department, Datuk Hasanah Abdul Hamid, was exposed by Malaysia Today for writing a letter to Gina Haspel, Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), before the 14th General Election, mentioning that if the ruling Barisan Nasional coalition could only win a simple majority of seats, the country might face a deadlock. At that time, she hoped the US would continue to support the Najib administration in order to maintain stability and strengthen friendship between the two countries. The report described the Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department as an agency similar to an intelligence unit.
