20-9-2023 (KUALA LUMPUR) News emerged last week that Norwegian authorities had detained a Malaysian citizen in Oslo on suspicion of espionage. While the man was not accused of spying for Malaysia, authorities believe he was not operating alone. His precise affiliations remain uncertain.
The incident highlights Malaysia’s complicated relationships with Western powers amid escalating tensions between the West and Russia and China.
For some time, Norway’s intelligence agencies have viewed Russia and China as major security threats, intensified since Russia invaded Ukraine. Fears abound of potential Russian intrusions in northern regions like the Baltics, Finland and Poland.
These concerns predate the invasion. Iran and North Korea also pose potential threats to Norway. Meanwhile, NATO members report increased espionage linked to Russia. Recently, Poland accused six foreigners of Russian-backed sabotage and spying. UK authorities also arrested a parliamentary researcher for allegedly spying for China.
Media coverage oscillates between exaggerated comparisons to Cold War-era spy thrillers and dismissiveness of espionage as routine. However, the key overlooked aspect is the nationalities of those involved.
Disguising Spies with Foreign Citizenship
While spies often pose as diplomats, intelligence agencies provide non-official covers to enhance credibility. Foreign citizenship adds another layer of disguise.
To overcome counterintelligence, agencies use multifaceted approaches like sleepers, acquiring citizenship, borrowing passports or recruiting third-country nationals unaware of their true motives. But even elaborate covers can unravel under scrutiny.
Last year, Norway arrested a Brazilian academic, Mikhail Mikushin, suspected of being a Russian spy. The 2017 assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia was carried out by women from Indonesia and Vietnam who thought it was a prank. A suspected Mossad operation in Kuala Lumpur also allegedly used Malaysians as recruits.
Recruiting agents from unexpected places exploits blind spots, concealing the orchestrator while complicating investigations by enabling deniability.
Two Likely Suspects
Details of the Norway arrest suggest two potential recruiters of the Malaysian: Russia or China. It indicates a shift towards recruiting from non-aligned countries to mask involvement.
Malaysia remains neutral on Ukraine, one of few nations not participating in sanctions. But neutrality may not prevent foreign meddling.
Research I co-authored last year offers insights into pro-Russia attitudes among Malaysians online. While irrelevant to state decisions, it reveals perceptions for agencies to exploit.
Former PM Mahathir Mohamad often takes anti-Western stances, like questioning Russia’s responsibility for downing MH17. Meanwhile, MP Wong Chen urges peace without addressing Ukraine ceding territory.
Entangled in Remote Disputes
Malaysia’s passport affords easy travel and potentially less scrutiny – advantages for intelligence work. While the detained agent may have been exploited thus, the allegations could impact other Malaysians. Under the Penal Code, acts harming friendly relations are prohibited.
Countries should reevaluate neutrality to avoid strained ties. Though unclear who initiated contact, the agent may face up to ten years in prison per Norwegian law on intelligence gathering.
The Oslo arrest shows how smaller nations can unwittingly become entangled in distant disputes. In February, Malaysia notably backed a UN resolution for Russia to leave Ukraine. With intensified spying, neutrality will not necessarily prevent involvement in volatile dynamics.
